



**UNVEILING REGAN'S DEONTOLOGICAL ETHICS, PREROGATIVE FOR HUMANS
DIRECT DUTY TO ANIMALS.**

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ABSTRACT

The subject of the matter we are addressing here is the position taken by Regan in addressing the issue of our duty to animals. Bearing in mind that, duty arises on reciprocity of rights, how then he announces prerogative to nonhuman animals who cannot be aware or observe such reciprocity? Strictly speaking, duties and rights are terms that whenever stated their applicability is more to humans than to nonhuman entities. Though, Regan proclaims animals are patients, hence we have duty to respect and care for them, our duties to them are simply because we benefit from them in different ways. We have duties to domestic and wild animals because of their economic values but not virtually because they are, 'patients' as Regan claims.

Introduction

Our emphasis in this research is discourse on what is all about deontological ethics for Regan. We shall also look at how his ethics opens a new horizon which entitles humans moral duty to animals. There are those who will argue that we have duty to animals and other will argue that, we only have duties involving use of nonhuman animals. This chapter will try to find out whether we owe any moral duty to nonhuman animals.

Deontological Ethics

Regan adopts deontological ethics which is non-consequentialist as a turn away from utilitarianism ethics which is consequentialist in its nature. The endorsement of the deontological ethics aims to consider how we ought to treat animals. The term deontological according to the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* is, derived from the Greek words *deon* meaning duty and *logos* which means study. Deontology is one of the normative theories regarding which choices are morally required, forbidden or permitted. (*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* on <https://plato.stanford.edu>) Deontological ethics therefore address what we ought to do as moral beings. Unlike utilitarian theory which judges morality from a consequences point of view, deontological ethics argues for some things as intrinsically right or wrong irrespective of the consequences. Singer denies use of animals on the consequences that it denies animals, pleasure and therefore calling for taking to consideration animals, sufferings.

Regan approaches animals, moral concern from the perspective of being possessors of a life and inherent value. Regan argues for moral duty to nonhuman animals. He states that, moral rights breathe equality. They are the same for all who have them; nonhuman beings can justifiably be denied rights for arbitrary, prejudicial or morally irrelevant reasons.(Regan, 2003) We cannot argue that, human rights and animal rights are equal; neither can we say that duties to our fellow human beings ought to be equal to our duties to animals. The two entities are not of equal value, even though Regan may disputes the assertions by saying, that all are subject of a life and have inherent value.

In trying to put in place how we ought to relate with nonhuman animals, Regan says that, perhaps a more deontological approach may be more decisive in determining how we should be treating animals. Instead of trying to determine what will enable to greatest happiness of the

greatest number we can argue for more obligation and duty instead. (Regan, 2004) Here the point is that utilitarian is unsatisfying ethical theory when it comes to man-nonhuman animals, relationship. Thus, he claims that deontological theory aims at arguing for moral consideration for nonhuman animals; by avowing that, animals have intrinsic value and deserve moral consideration not only because they can suffer, but because they are, what he calls a subject of a life.

Regan drives across the belief that we are so much related to nonhuman animals, hence, he states that:

Our common neurological system and considerations about our common origins, whether through evolution or as a separate creation by God, supports this answer. If we view the question before us with an unbiased eye, we see a world brimming with animals who not only are our biological relatives, they are our psychological kin. Like us animals in the world are aware of the world, and aware of what happens to them. Despite our many differences, humans and other animals are the same in this crucial fundamental respect: we and they are subject of a life and have inherent value. (Regan, 2004)

Regan considers moral treatment of nonhuman animals as something which ought to be at par with the way we treat human beings, the reason been that, all have life and inherent value. Regan as an animal right advocate wants human to stop exploiting animals.

The conception in the mind of Regan is that, he wants people to sojourn doing awful things to nonhuman animals. Can we term using animals either as food, or as a commercial commodity as treating animals in a terrible way? As long as we use nonhuman animals in ways that are not malicious like killing them for food, or rearing them for their products or for use as means to an end, has nothing to do with exploitation.

We may be tempted to consider Regan as a scholar who is misanthropic, because of the direction he takes in condemning and abolishing use of animals. The claim he uses to guard his take is that, I would never have become an animal right advocate if I had not first been a human rights advocate especially those who lack the understanding. Animal advocates do not hate humanity.(2004) In as much as animal advocate for example those who argue for abolition of using animal and advocate vegetarianism have not justification to deny use of animals or even

their products, because using them does not deviate from what nature has made animals to be, instrumental value bearers.

Going by the argument on moral community debate, that only humans are part of the community, since they are able to understand and even appeal to their rights, thus nonhuman animals stand to be morally justified to be treated as having instrumental value. We do not have rights which we can invoke to show that their moral rights are violated when we treat them as our property or in using their products. Proponents of animals' moral rights, considers that we ought to respect animals by not using them as tools to progress our interests. They argue that, if animals have any rights at all they have the right to be respected, the right not to be used as a tool to advance human interests, no matter how important those human interests are thought to be. (Regan, 2003) We therefore, have a moral duty to observe our respect to other animals, but can we say observing such a moral duty entails not to use animals to satisfy someone of our interests? There are two parallel debates on whether we have moral duty to nonhuman animals.

Our obligation to other nonhuman animals necessitates first establishing if they have 'moral status'. Mary Anne Warren's view concerning moral status and obligation to nonhuman entities is that, the concept of moral status is quite simply a means of specifying those entities towards which we believe ourselves to have moral obligations. (Warren, 1997) Moral status entitles moral duties which carry along with them moral responsibilities that is, moral duties.

Indirect Duty

The assertion of the indirect duty supporters says that, we have duties involving animals but denies that we have any duties to them. (Regan, 2003) Those who support the indirect duty conception do not think that, we have any direct moral duty to animals. We may therefore, not be accused in using animals, since we are entitled to treat and use them as our property. An example to elaborate the argument on indirect duty goes this way:

Suppose you share your life with a dog, which you love dearly. Your next door neighbor does not share your affection. He regards your dog as nuisance and makes no effort to conceal his feelings. One, day without provocation, you see him deliberately break her leg. Proponents of indirect duty views will agree that your neighbor has done something wrong; but not to the dog but to the owner of the dog. (Regan, 2003)

When we fail in our moral duties to animals, we do not consider it as failing r morally wrong on the basis that it affects the animal (s) but on the basis that it affects the owner of the animal (s).

In direct moral duty proponents do not consider that we fail in our moral duties to animals directly but indirectly, because what we do to animals, affects those who own them directly while affecting the animals indirectly. Consequently, they consider that:

The wrong that has been done, they will say, is a wrong to you. After all, it is wrong to upset people and by injuring your dog, your neighbor has upset you; so you are the one who is wronged, not your dog. Through breaking your dog's leg, your neighbor damages your property. Since it is wrong to damage another person's property, your neighbor has done something wrong to you, not to your dog. Your neighbor no more wrongs your dog by breaking her than would wrong your clock if he broke its hands. (Regan, 2003)

In direct duty protagonists deny that we have any direct duties to nonhuman animals, that why they disregards harming of the dog as directly affecting the animal itself, but rather as directly affecting its owner.

The in direct duty proclamation does not consider the suffering of the dog as something directly affecting it, by doing so they error. We cannot deny that failure to treat animals well affect them directly while it may affect indirectly the owners. Civil laws put in place to enhance protection to animals especially wild animals, aims at protecting the animals as a property for a country and failing to observe the duty to respect through involving oneself in activities which threatens or violates the laws put in place is morally wrong.

Somehow the theory of in direct duty is also right to some extent. Poaching is illegal because it harms animals on which a country may be dependent on as a means of foreign exchange. Regan asserts that, people who accept indirect views might deny direct duties to nonhuman animals because these animals are not created in the image of God or because animals, unlike us, are not able to use abstract principles when they make decisions. (Regan, 2003) We only have direct duty to our fellow human beings and not to nonhuman entities, such that if we fail to perform our duties we directly affect others.

The ascription of moral status grants an entity a certain standing, imposing restrictions on our actions for the sake of that entity. The latter point is important because it is perfectly possible to have obligations regarding something, without necessarily having obligations to that thing. (Alasdair, 2014) Duties rendered to nonhuman animals are simply duties which do not directly affect the animals themselves but their owners, that is, human beings. An example used in explaining the point highlighted here by Alasdair states that:

Imagine that I have an obligation not to kick your dog, on what basis might this obligation be founded? On one hand, the obligation might be based on the fact that you own the dog and do not want it to be kicked. In this case, my obligation relates to the dog, but is ultimately owed to you; we need not to consider the dog to have moral status of his own. Alternatively, my obligation not to kick the dog might persist even if you encourage me to kick it. This might be because my obligation is based on the fact that kicking the dog will cause him pain. (Alasdair, 2014)

Moral obligation in the above case originated from both direct and indirect duty, because we have taken into consideration, obeying the duty regarding to the owner and to the dog.

Thus, my moral obligation is owed to the dog himself and so it is considered to have moral status. Moral status then, is a means of delineating the entities to which we have moral obligations. (Alasdair, 2014) The stand Alasdair takes, is exactly that of Regan who considers moral status to animals on the fact that, they are subject of a life and have inbuilt value. Alasdair is convinced that, in order to have moral status, an entity must have capacity for well-being; in other words, it must have a life that can go well or bad for itself. We have moral obligations to sentient animals. (Alasdair, 2014) Our duty to animals is taken by Thomas Aquinas as something owed to only rational beings. Hence he writes that:

The very condition of the rational creature, in that it has dominion over its actions, requires that care of providence should be bestowed on it for its own sake. The condition of other things that have dominion over their actions shows that they are cared for, not for their own sake, but as being directed to other things. Intellectual creatures are ruled by God, as though He cared for them for their own sake, while others creatures are ruled as being directed to rational creatures. (Aquinas, 1274)

Human beings are self-directed moral beings since they are 'principal agent' with ability to carry out moral obligations.

Creatures around the environment exist in service for intellectual creatures. Human beings are cognitive beings therefore, may use others animals and plants for their good. Nature permits humanity to have duty to other animals and the environment at large for the good of humanity. Then, it is asserted that, many believe that today's debates about human-animal interactions are fundamental. The issues are about whether the nonhuman nature of other animals is morally relevant, and if it is relevant, what humanity and justice permit us to do with animals. (Orlans and Beauchamp, 1998) As human beings do we owe any moral obligation to animals and why?

Our duties to animals are not founded on duty and rights reciprocity, but are founded on instrumental value. It is said that, if animals have no place in the moral community, no moral standing then, it appears that humans owe nothing to animals and can do with animals as they wish. On this account, we owe obligations to the humans who own animals, but not to the animals owned. (Orlans and Beauchamp, 1998) Harming animals is treating them with cruelty and ought to be condemned at all grounds. Nevertheless, indirect duty proponents argue that, if you poison your neighbor's barking dog, you violate a moral obligation that you have not to destroy your neighbor's property; you do not violate any obligation to the animal. Animals are no different than plants in the neighbor's garden; if you poison them, you have wronged the neighbor only, not the plants. (Orlans and Beauchamp, 1998) Moral right and duty applies directly to human beings though, it does not mean that we are justified in handling animals and the environment anyhow. We always have to keep in mind, the value of caring for the environment at large.

In spite of the fact that, human beings interact with other animals such a relationship is characterized by duties we perform on them. In fact according to Ingvild Saelid Gilhus conviction, how human animals and nonhuman animals relate to each other depends on the moral, material and technological developments in a particular society. It further depends on how the distinctions between humans and animals are drawn and on what sort of animals species we are talking about. (Gilhus, 2006) Our duties to those animals that are more considered as having moral value are given more attention than others. As it is written that, the relationship between humans and sheep, for instance will always be different from the way humans relate to lions or

locusts. The cultural value of animals is strongly influenced by their usefulness to man. (Gilhus, 2006) Duties towards nonhuman animals are executed on the presupposition that at the end of the day, we benefit from them.

Anthropocentric ethicist denies that we owe direct duties to nonhuman animals. Kant for example writes that, we do not have true duties to animals. A human being, he claims can only have a duty to other human beings, because the object of our duty must be a person. Non-rational beings of all kinds are not persons but things. (Kant, 1785) Whatever exists as a thing in Kantian sense ought to be treated as a means to something. Nonhuman animals are in the Kantian conception virtually 'things'. Therefore Kant continues to say that:

When we take it that we have duties to animals, we are committing an amphiboly in moral concepts of reflection that is; making a sort of a mistake. We are mistaking our duty with regard to animals a duty to animals. Such duties belong indirectly to a human being's duty with regard to animals. Animals have an indirect reference to our duties towards mankind. (Kant, 1991)

In Kantian's line of thought, one can only be said to act immorally towards animals because the action performed affects the owner(s), directly. Hence, he asserts that, we have indirect duties regarding animals because mistreatment of them violates a duty to humanity. Kant construes it as a duty to oneself: cruelty to animals demeans us and damages our own humane and sympathetic qualities. (Kant, 1785) The way we treat other animals may picture how we may act when the involved are humans.

Arguments of Kant concerning moral duty as something owed to only humans has not gone without some philosophers objection. Christina Hoff says that, "it is implausible that our duty to feed a hungry retarded child would turn out to be indirect and this respect, essentially distinct from our duty to feed a normal child. (Hoff, 1983) Just as we cannot justify denying direct duties to children who are mentally challenged, we are not justified to do the same to animals.

Duties for Kant involve duties to oneself and to others, whereby others here means our fellow human beings. The argument he makes is that, I can recognize that I am under obligation to others only insofar as I at the same time put myself as being under obligation. When man is conscious of a duty to himself, he views himself as the subject of duty. (Kant, 1991) Only human

beings are subjects of a duty because they are not only sensible beings but also rational. Human beings are beings under obligations unlike nonhuman animals.

We may say that, one has a moral duty to preserve his life and those of others. Taking away one's or another person's life is wrong for it violates the obligation of preserving human life. Duties which deny humans from acting morally centrally to an end are, 'negative duties'. Negative duties, forbids human beings from, acting contrary to the end of his nature and so have to do merely with his moral self-preservation. Positive duties, command him to make a certain object of choice his end, concerning his perfecting of himself. (Kant, 1991) As moral animals we have duties and rights. We are therefore, bound to observing the duties and rights as moral beings. When we fail to perform our duties to animals, we are guilty morally because we fail in observing our duty to those who own the animals. Regan declares that, all indirect duty views are and must be unsatisfactory. (Regan, 2003) In direct moral theories as they reject that we have duties to animals.

According to Regan, *The Meaning of Animal Rights*, points out that, moral agents and moral patients have rights which impose duties on morally responsible agents to treat them with respect as possessors of inherent value. Animals are moral patients rather than moral agents since they are not responsible for what they do. (Regan, 1985) Rights of animals and our duties towards them are raised not on rights and duties reciprocity but rather on integral value possessed by animals.

It may seem to go without saying that animals with higher inherent value should also be regarded as having more rights and duties than those of lower inherent value. Regarding humans as deserving respect and duty alone is to imply that they are more superior and highly regarded than animals. Human beings and animals cannot therefore, be equal in terms of value and responsibilities.

In Regan's view:

Insisting that humans deserve respect while nonhuman animals do not, would be to adopt unjustifiable species chauvinism. The alternative is to admit that humans and animals have rights, and that humans as moral agents are ethically obligated to act toward animals with the respect they are due as the subjects of a life and the possessors of inherent value, refraining from harming them by inflictions or

deprivations, and protecting them from violations of their rights by other moral agents. (Regan, 1985)

The footing of our duty to animals as well as animals' rights is the recognition that animals have inherent value and we have a duty to uphold this through proper treatment of animals.

We may to some extent admit that we have some similarities with animals. It is written that, "these commonalities do not preclude our being superior to animals in some ways, as some. What we share in common with invertebrates is multicellular bodies including complex nervous systems. (Domrowski, 1988) Animals whether regarded as having innate value or not, are not the same with humanity, man is rendered to be of higher value. Necessarily meaning that duties to him-self cannot be equal to those he owes other animals.

Regan asserts that welfare of animals ought to be taken into consideration when he contends that, The ground of the rights framework is the postulate that all welfare subjects have inherent value. Animals are something different from, and something more than, mere receptacles of what has intrinsic value. (Regan, 1986) Our duties to animals are therefore not based on a vacuum rather on the inherent value, which animals possess. Abolishing use of animals does not enhance our sense of responsibility to them but rather blows the reason as to why we care for them. Duties to non-human animals are done on our rational nature in carrying out activities which promotes more benefitting outcome for the sake of human beings. We do not therefore carry out our duties to animals for their sake.

Animals, for Regan should be conceived in a way that reveals, they have in their own right, a value that is distinct from, not reducible to, and commensurate with the values of those experiences which, as receptacles, they have or undergo. (Regan, 1986) We have commercialized animals as means of enhancing our daily living, something which Regan disregards. It is clear that, Whenever we treat animals as if they were mere receptacles of valuable experiences (for example; pleasure or preference satisfaction) or as their value depended upon their utility relative to the interests of others. In particular, therefore we fail to display proper respect for those who have inherent value whenever we harm them. (Regan, 1986) Using animals as food or as a commercial commodity does not violate animal rights; we go wrong if we use them with malice.

We perform our duties to animals for the reasons that, human beings owe great deal to animals, not only have they been a source of food and clothing, but for thousands of years, they have served as labor force. It is safe to say that humanity would not be what it is today if it were not for animals. (Hile, 2004) There is moral violations in using animals in ways in which nature have put them. Forbidding using them as long as we are not being cruel is a great deviation from our true relationship with them. Using animals as means in supporting our daily life has therefore, nothing wrong. We do not deviate from nature by eating animals or by using as a source of raw material. Our duties to animals can only be realized by recognizing the natural reason as to why we care for them.

Some of the ancient attitudes concerning how people relate with animals, is pronounced in the proclamation that, majority of the history of Western civilization, animals have been viewed as tools and resources to benefit humanity; something which is considered ethical by most Christian theologians, because animals are not believed to have souls thus not entitled to same consideration as humans. (Hile, 2004) Humans are therefore, noble and deserving rights and duties which is a way of enhancing human dignity. One human being should not treat the other in a dehumanizing way, with or without his consent. Our moral conscience should also guide us as we relate with nonhuman animals and the environment.

In *Summa Theologica*, Aquinas argues that, God established a hierarchy of life forms in nature so that the lower forms may be killed and eaten by the higher forms. Plants are to be killed by animals for food, and animals are to be killed by humans for food. Animals lack reason hence are naturally enslaved and accommodated to the uses of others. (Aquinas, 1274) As spelled by the great theologian, it is clear that animals are only regarded as having instrumental value and it is on this value that we base our duties for them. In fact Aquinas seems to embrace animals as property of human beings. We interrupt no rights or duties by using animals in humane way for human benefits.

The argument for animal's inherent value is seen to be a key foundation of animal right and our duties to them. Saahil Papar shows that, the term inherent value express why Regan, feels inherent value can be described as the value an animal possesses in its own right, as an end in itself, the opposite of this is instrumental value which means that an animal only has value to other animals such as human beings. Though Papar recognizes animals as having inbuilt value,

he does not agree with idea of dividing animals into two realms, those with inherent value hence having same basic rights with humans and those without inherent value have no moral right. Papar says that, I disagree quite strongly with this notion; I feel that all animals, including humans have a combination of inherent value and instrumental value and that this combination is largely dependent on where the animals lie on the food chain.” (Saahil Papar://scholarblogs.emory.edu/millsonphl115/2014/01/animal-rights-inherent-value) Animals in his understanding cannot be therefore disregarded our duties, if duties are to be entitled on basis of intrinsic value.

Emily Wang writes that, just because animals have inherent value, it should not mean that they are allowed to have the same rights as humans. Before considering we decide if animals should have the same rights with humans, we should consider if they have the same level of inherent value as us. (Emily Wang, *Responses to animal rights inherent value*https://scholarblogs.emory.edu/millsonphl115/2014/12/01/animal-rights-inherent-value) In her view’s Regan goes astray by granting humanity and animals as having the same level of inherent value which boils to granting animals same basic rights with humans. In the same line of thought just as with Regan, inherent value becomes so crucial when granting rights and duties to beings. Though animals have inherent value, for her, it is not of the same value with human beings, meaning they cannot have the same rights with humanity and our duties to them as well.

Hugh Phillis in reaction to the view declares that, “I agree with the notion that living beings have inherent value. This value is an end in itself, irrespective of other factors. However, using this fact as a precedent for stating a universal equality of rights is foolish not because it is wrong, but also unrealistic (Hugh Phillishttps://scholarblogs.emory.edu/millsonphl115/2014/12/01/animal-rights-inherent-value) Humans and animals cannot therefore be having equivalent rights and our duties to them cannot be of equal measure with those we owe to our fellow human beings. Abolishing use of animals in ways that benefit humanity is self-defeating. There is no way one can be said to have duties without having rights. It is on this basis that, the apparent duties we have to abstain from cruel treatment of animals turns out not to be direct duties regarding to animals, but duties to ourselves and merely indirect duties with regard to animals. (Potter, 2005) Hereby inherent value is not a guarantee that we have duties towards animals.

Human beings may not emphasize animal's inherent value as roots for our duties to them as seen in this quote that, "Animals are encumbrance because there is not enough room for them. Food and living pace is much a problem for animals as for men. (Dirole, 1974) We raise and tame animals as a way of enhancing our lives. Using animals as food to support our lives is therefore not wrong. As put by Philippe Dirole that, ironically it is at this stage that man, who has slaughtered and displaced animals and destroyed their habitats, has now developed a new affection for them. Many of us feel a common bond with animals, a bond based on a common precarious hold on life. (Dirole, 1974) The argument that man has realized the need to love animals and care for animals is too instrumentally based. Our duties are not strictly for the sake of animals themselves but for the output which the animals give as return.

Dirole maintains that, man is now brought face to face with his former companions in creation, companion which man has rendered useless, has deformed, has imprisoned, has turned into neurotics; companions which man, as their master, can bring himself neither to kill, nor to set free, nor to reject. (Dirole, 1974) We do not own the universe; we live in it just like other entities. As humans we cannot proclaim to be so superior at the cost of exploiting animals, hence ignoring our duties to them. Having dominion over animals and the environment does not mean that we should not have moral concern to whatever we do to them or with them.

Human beings depend on animals for profit reasons; our responsibilities to them are simply because we are bond to them by the gains we get from them. Man has lived his life in the midst of a world of animals. During the time when his mind was being formed, he was bound to animals in an ambiguous relationship of dependence. He is both the tributary of the animals and executioner, and that is the reason why it is not possible for man today to stand aloof from animals. (Dirole, 1974) Our relationship with animals is a relationship characterized by dependency. We depend on them for different doles.

Man is indifferent to animals; he esteems their existence not as an end but as a means towards an end. They exist for the good of man but not rather for themselves. It is stated that:

It is often argued that man has been granted dominion over the rest of nature by God. Such claim is also put non-theologically when it is asserted that man stands at the apex of the evolutionary pyramid. Once again, holding theological skepticism in abeyance, we may unearth a profound philosophical point in

discussing this claim. Even if man has been placed by God at the peak of the great chain of being, or even in command of it, it does not follow that the creatures beneath him may be treated by him in any way he sees fit. (Rollin, 1981)

We have a responsibility to observing how we interact with them. Whether animals are below us in terms of hierarchy, whether they are capable of speech or not is something which does not water down our responsibility towards them. We ought to treat animals with a lot of care and kindness.

In supporting the assertion Benard E. Rollin confirms that, being at the top does not entail that one can treat the creatures beneath in any way one chooses. Animals are justified in the inclusion within the scope of moral concern because of the evolutionary continuity between man and animals. (Rollin, 1981) The argument that we are superior hence we should control other animals is a reality that cannot be avoided; only that if wrongly misconceived may result to disregarding our duties to other animals. Animals have rights and we have a duty to observe the rights as rational beings.

Claiming to be superior to animals is something which ought to be well understood. In Rollin's conception that, to better understand our rejection of the moral relevance of human 'supremacy', one must consider what sense can be made of the claim that man is at the 'top'. Since man creates the ratings, he can do as he chooses, but what is the criterion of superiority? (Rollin, 1981)The procedure of according superiority to human beings is based on differences between him and animals. Man conceives himself to be rational hence such a capacity creates a demarcation between him and non-rational animals. On the same note, he considers himself as deserving rights and duties different from other animals. Other animals have no duties entitled to them, but we have duties regarding them as rational animals.

Ability to reason is something which scores higher hence regarding man as superior to nonhuman animals. In Rollin's opinion as he puts it that, intelligence allows us to control, vanquish dominate and destroy all other creatures. In case, it is power that puts us on top of the pyramid; but if power provides grounds for including or excluding creatures from the scope of moral concern, we have essentially accepted the legitimacy of the thesis that might, makes right. (Rollin, 1981) Animal rights advocate wishes to make man achieve a new conception,

marking the beginning of a new horizon where animals' rights and human duties towards animals are to be observed.

Referring from Rollin, it is so evidenced that, the superior position of man does not serve as adequate grounds for excluding animals from moral concern. Man is obligated to be moral towards other creatures precisely because of his supreme position and superior power. (Rollin, 1981) The superiority which we claim to possess as human beings should not be used as an escape from our duties to animals and a claim to justify misconduct to them and the environment.

Stephen C. Bostock, argues that, there is a very important aesthetic and conservational respect owing to animals and to anything else natural or artificial worth conserving. Animals deserve our respect because they can feel, suffer pain and experience pleasure, and because in short, it matters to them how they are treated. (Bostock, 1993) Rights and duties aims at conserving animals, but eradicating use of animal is a great violation of nature's dictate. Stephen proceeds in arguing that:

My concern here is not the question of whether any fine or beautiful object has intrinsic value, a value independent of its usefulness to or appreciation by humans. I am merely noting that the respect due to fine objects goes beyond a respect due to them as someone else's property, or if they are yours is such that you have not a complete right to do anything you like with them. It is not just a matter of not destroying something of value; it is a matter of caring for it, in the appropriate way. (Bostock, 1993)

Our responsibility towards animals is not a favor we give to them, but rather we only play our role as beings having rationality. We should not be guided by instrumental value in order to care for them, but instead their natural aesthetic beside inherent value should motivate us.

Rendering Nel Nodding's thought that, our lives are interdependent with those of nonhuman animals and plants. Many of us have come to realize that the quality of human life cannot be entirely separated from the conditions that nurture other living things. (Nodding's, 2005) As human beings we depend on nature, we need food, shelter and clothing for a fair living. Such basics can only be obtained from some of the entities within the environment we occupy. Banning use of animals therefore may affect human life as a being endowed with dignity. Rights

and duties claimed by animal abolitionists seem to demean human rights and duties. They have no moral justification to abolish use of animals, whether on sentience or inherent value claims.

Our duties to animals, is something which ought to be inculcated in us right from childhood. The society has therefore failed in playing a positive role in putting some sense, the need to respect animals which also extends to the environment. Suppose we are brought up being aware that, humiliating an animal is something wrong, we are likely to develop a guilty conscience whenever we do contrary to our expectation.

Animals are capable of experiencing pleasure and pain knowing that, animals feels deep sorrow; they experience everything from mild neglect and abandonment to physical cruelty and abuse. Appropriate experience with animals involves an appreciative study of responsiveness (Nodding's, 2005) We should therefore have a concern about the experience of other animals. Nodding goes on to saying that, sensitivity to the responses of human beings is basic in moral life. Similarly, sensitivity to the responses of animals is the basic to the development of compassion for them. A creature's capacity for response in part defines our obligation to it. (Nodding's, 2005) Animals therefore have rights and we have duty concerning them.

Though we are convinced to have dominion as rational beings, it may be put that, the created world is not simply there for human beings to exploit, and draws attention to the place of animals in that world. Animals have their own meaning and feeling. (Simons, 1992) However basing on the same argument it is so flawless that Simons continues to press on saying that:

There is no social contract between humans and nonhumans. Therefore, their interactions are not at any fundamental level socialized. I would wish to argue that humans and animals do not differ in significant physiological ways. They share sentience and they relate to their immediate environment in ways designed to ensure their own survival and that of their group. (Simons, 1992)

Human beings emphasize so much on the differences rather than the similarities we share with nonhuman animals. Animals are conceived as not having reason and language hence becoming a backup for arguing against rights or duties towards them. Simons writes that:

Few people would, I think take exception to the proposition that human beings have duty to sustain other human beings especially if these other human beings are, for one reason or other unable to sustain themselves. The issue of duty and

animal rights creates a challenge not so much to this position itself but to its limits and also to the implications of holding to it from within an anthropocentric world view. The question is: if we attribute ourselves in certain circumstances, a duty of care to the helpless human, why should we not do the same for animals? (Simons, 1992)

Human beings responsibility to other animals is something still not yet fulfilled. Just as we care to the less fortunate in the society, we should do the same to animals.

In the view of Julian H. Franklin, we may denote that, the idea that humans have at least obligations to animals is very old. Animal interests must be accorded the same respect as that given to human beings. (Franklin, 2005) We have duty to ensure that nonhuman-animals are not mishandled or exploited in any manner. Whether domestic or wild animals they deserve a gentle treatment. Animals should not therefore, be subjected to avoidable suffering.

Regan puts across a fundamental argument which states that, what is, fundamentally wrong with the way animals are treated is not the details that vary from case to case. The fundamental wrong is the system that allows us to view animals as our resources. Hence see animals as here for us to be eaten, or surgically manipulated, or exploited for sport or money. (Regan, 1986) We have a responsibility of ensuring that we do not perpetuate in any way harming of other animals. We should have some empathy about their pain or even unnecessary death caused by our activities.

Regan shows that from religious point of view we need to care for animals. According to him we see that, Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism believe that either we (the living and continuing self) will be reborn or there will a continuation in some future appearance. In all three religions it is possible to be reborn or reappear as an animal. Surely this must create a bond of caring and compassion for animals. (Regan, 1986) The care for animals is not in this sense drawn from the intrinsic value rather from the possible future of becoming like them. In the same work it is argued that, Since the animals on which you experiment today may be your future identity tomorrow, we have a role to care for them. (Regan, 1986) Even though Christianity cannot subscribe to such a belief of becoming animals after death, the moral of the story is to drive us to a sense of duty.

We only regard moral respect and duty to things of respect. It so clearly outlined by the saying that, Something can correctly be regarded as an object of moral action, if and only if, it is worthy of respect. It follows that persons, and persons only can be objects of moral action. (Broadie and Pybus, 1974) Such an argument boils to assertion that only human beings deserve to be termed as ends in themselves. Any other being which is not regarded as worth of moral justification is simply to be treated as means. Using nonhuman animals as means is therefore, morally justified.

Another assertion says that, unless animals are rational they cannot be regarded as ends in themselves. Only by use of a questionable argument can animals be shown to give rise to any moral duties at all. Our duties towards animals are in some way dependent on our duties towards persons. (Broadie and Pybus, 1974) Our duties to animals in this sense are not directly emerging from animals' inherent value but from the owners of the animals. The view of H. J. Paton is that:

Now I say that man and in general every rational being, exists as an end in itself. It exists not merely as means for arbitrary use by this or that will. Beings, whose existence depends, not on our will but on nature, have none the less, if they are non-rational beings, only a relative value means and are consequently called things. (Paton, 1966)

Animals are described as non-rational animals hence, considered as simply 'things'. Things here are only rendered to be treated as means, meaning that we have no direct duty bond to them. We are bond in terms of duties to those who own the animals. Our duties to animals are not constrained by moral responsibility of 'ought' because it is a prima facie, set by nature.

It is indicated that:

So far as mere reason can judge, man has duties only to man (himself and other men); for his duty to any subject is moral necessitation by that subject's will. Hence the necessitating subject must first be a person. The person must secondly be given an object of experience, but with all our experience we know of no being other than man that would be susceptible of obligation. Thus, man can have no duties to beings other than man. (Gregor, 1964)

Human beings for this sense in this line of thought are not entitled to any duty towards brutes.

L. Infieldin, declares that animals nature has analogies to human nature and by doing our duties to human nature; we indirectly do our duty towards humanity. Thereby if a dog has served his master long and faithfully, his service on the analogy of human service deserves reward. (Infield, 1963) Here our duties to animals are displayed as something which is at our will. One cannot be held responsible for not meeting duties to animals. Further in the same work it is said that, if then any acts of animals are analogous to human acts and spring from the same principles; we have duties towards animals. (Infield, 1963) Our actions are not homologous with those of animals; they are willed and decided before execution, unlike with nonhuman animals. Through adhering to duties we owe to others, we in a certain way adhere to our duties to animals.

Nelson Potter says that there are no human beings such that they have only duties and no rights. The apparent duties that we have to abstain from cruel treatment of nonhuman animals are, only indirect duties regarding animals. (Potter, 2005) Our duties towards animals are only performed not for the sake of animals themselves but rather for the sake of humans. In, direct duties view; there is no direct harm or even violations when we fail to observe our duties to animals. The reason as to why the author argues for direct duties as only entitled to humans alone, is because failure to carry them out is violation of one's or another person's rights.

The duties we have in Potter's claim are to those animals which are vertebrates. Potter points out that, Most of all invertebrates would be excluded as non-paradigm. The reason is because they do not have nervous systems well enough integrated to undergo pain and suffering like those of humans. If we have duties to any animals, we have duties to such as them. It seems reasonable to extend our duties towards these most promising animal candidates. (Potter, 2005) We therefore, perform our duties to animals out of the duty we owe to our fellow human beings. Lara Denis states that, animals do not qualify as bearers of intrinsic value; any moral consideration they warrant is derived from their relationship with us. (Denis, 2000) Abolishing use of animals may not promote our realization of our duties to them. It instead interrupts our relationship with animals because our relationship with them is so instrumentally oriented.

Angus Taylor emphasizes that, mentioning of animals, when it occurred was usually incidental to concern with human beings. Animals (non-human) were generally perceived as significantly different from, and inferior to, humans. (Taylor, 2009) Nonhuman animals are not for different reasons regarded as morally important. More they say that, animals are regarded as inferior

because, are seeing to lack some crucial quality, reason or moral agency, self-awareness or consciousness at all. Such a misconception does not recognize as morally in any fundamental way. (Taylor, 2009) Though it is a fact that we have some variations with other animals, such differences should not be used as an escape for man's responsibility to animals.

Singer's explicitly argues for man's duty to animals. He denies any discrimination between us and animals majorly based on species, when he speaks that, just as we have come to the realization that discrimination on the basis of race or sex is not acceptable, so we must put aside the idea that it is acceptable to discriminate on basis of species. Hence, animals' interests merit the same consideration as the similar interests of humans. (Singer, 2002) In other words, as we act to fulfill our interests we have a duty to consider animals' interests. In the understanding of abolitionists, both human as well as animals' interests matter equally.

We therefore, ought to be conscious of how our actions affect animals. Taylor argues that, in particular we must not think that the suffering or pleasure experienced by animals counts any less from a moral point of view than a like amount of suffering or pleasure experienced by humans. (Taylor, 2009) There is no subordination when it comes to duty and interest. Our duties to animals should be to promote their interests. Therefore, animals must no longer be treated essentially as resources from human use. (Taylor, 2009) Such an argument appears to be more theoretical than practical. Nature dictates on the flow of energy right from primary producers to the consumers. In this line of thought nature dictates humans to use animals for their benefits especially as food.

In as much as Regan aims at ensuring a just interaction with animals, he appears to be exaggerating the issue of rights and duties. The use of the term interests denotes that, one has feelings of well-being that can be affected by what happens to oneself. (Taylor, 2009) The assertion that we should not use animals may end up affecting our relationship with them. We relate with animals for various reasons. Enthusiastically another assertion is that:

Human relationships with nonhuman animals are complex. Some animals are treasured as pets, receive our love and devotion. The pets are provided with a diet and quality health care better than some humans in the developing world. Other animals in contrast, are factory farmed and slaughtered so that their bodies can

provide meat. The meat we share with our pets. Yet other animals are regarded as experimental equipment. (Caviola, Everett and faber, 2018)

The above explanation shows that the argument by Regan and other abolitionists, who target completely abolishing the use of animals, may cause much discomfort to human beings.

We may not have noticed anything wrong with the use of animals as resources; it is not a violation of any of our duty. It is wrong to treat animals as our resources because they have inherent value and are ends in themselves just like ourselves. (Howei, 1995) Just like Regan, he is convinced that we have duty towards animals, underlined by the fact that they have inherent value. Additionally he says that, to say we have equal inherent value is to say that we are something more than, something different from, measly vessels. Moreover, to insure that we do not pave the way for such injustices as slavery or sexual discrimination, we must believe that all who have inherent value have it equally. (Howei, 1995)

In built value becomes the bottom line on which he uses to repute any mortal being as deserving equivalent treatment. It is on the same note that, moral rights is inched on value which the animals possess. In strict sense human beings cannot be equal with animals, because man endowed with self-conscious. Though at this point we sound to be spiciest more light shall be shed on in the preceding chapters. Human beings have the capacity to affiliate values to things. Animals themselves probably may not be aware of their value(s). Thus, our duties to them are executed because we know they are valuable to us.

Similar description of what it means to have value is given in the uttering that, “when we value something we have a positive response towards it. The value of things is a matter of our preferences or desires. (MacKinnon and Fiala, 2018) Here choosing involves liberations which involves use of the mind and will. We may say that only humans have such a capacity. Values are of two types, namely: “Intrinsic and instrumental values. Inherent value, refer to value or worth in things themselves. Something has instrumental value if it is valued because of its usefulness for some other purpose and for someone. (MacKinnon and Fiala, 2018) Whether the two types of values are realizable in nonhuman animals is an issue of debate.

Animals belong to the biotic family, it is said that, environmental holism can be either practical or ethical; it is one thing to say that, one should take holistic perspective. It is quite another to say that ecosystem or biotic communities themselves have intrinsic moral value or direct moral standing. (Vamer, 1998) Denying that we cannot be held into according for not performing our duties to animals, is a way of indorsing speciesism. Though doing wrong to a human being may not me as equal as doing wrong to animals, we ought to be guided by our reason to do good rather than to do wrong, to preserve rather than to destroy.

Difference between human beings and animals is something which is used to contempt animals as non-moral agents. Only human persons are taken to be moral agents. In Lori Gruen indicates that:

Moral agents as persons have certain capacities that allow them to make reflective choices about their actions and to attend to those who may not be able to make such choices: but who nonetheless have lives that will be affected, for better or worse by our actions. Non-persons are moral patients and because moral patients lack certain capacities, there may be certain things that it is not wrong to do to them, that would be wrong if these same actions were done to persons. (Gruen, 2011)

Brutes do not have the ability for understanding that they exist. Therefore, painlessly killing a non-person who has no conscious interest or desire to continue living is not, all things considered, wrong in the way killing a person who does have explicit desire to continue to exist. Similarly, persons are self-directed and thus, denying them their freedom would be ethically problematic. (Gruen, 2011) In other terms, our duties to our related human beings are highly to be considered and esteemed than those of animals. Human rights and duties for this matter override those of nonhuman animals. In the same work he makes it clear that, denying animals, freedom may actually be the right thing to do from an ethical perspective. (Gruen, 2011) Doing so should only be allowed in areas where animals may endanger human life.

In Harian B. Millerrand and William Williams views reveals that we are bound to relate with animals in support of our good not for their good. They say that, plants exist for the sake of animals and the other animals for the good of man. Domestic species exist for his service and his good, and of his supplies of other kinds, in order that they may furnish him both with clothing and with other appliances. (Miller and Williams, 1983) Our duties to animals are in direct hence aims at keeping them in place for human benefit. We do recognize their instrumental value and

this marks the genesis of our responsibilities to them. The two continues to say that, if therefore nature makes nothing without purpose or in vain, it follows that nature has made all animals for the sake of men. (Miller and Williams, 1983) Regan's efforts to eradicate use of animals goes against nature, nature ordained man to use animals in different ways. We cannot deny the use of animals by basing our argument on inherent value only, for it goes against the reality that animals do possess instrumental value.

Our relationship with animals may not be based on the over looked issue of inherent value in animals. We should accept that our lives are so interactive with animals and the environment at large. No wonder this may be why Michael P. Mueller, Deborah J. Tippins and Arthur J. Stewart writes that, it is wild to think that we might embrace our animalistic nature rather than treat, 'her' as an object to be exploited and manipulated. We critically depend on the natural world for our survival. Humans have interacted with animals for millions of years, primarily by harvesting them as food. (Muller, Tippins and Stewart, 2017) Such allegations points out the unalienable interaction between humans and non-human animals. Our obligations to them are therefore, not to be addressed without considering, how they benefit humanity.

We are animals, but whenever we use this term little do we thinking we are inclusive in its use. Use of the coined term, '*anymal*' tries to look for a language in which man that is *Homo sapiens* is excluded from being considered as animals. Lisa Kemmerer's book called, *In Search of Consistency: Ethics and Animals* says that, the importance of this term should not be overlooked. Referring to '*anymals*' as "animals" (as if we ourselves were not included) artificially distances people from Yorkshire hogs and Chickens, Meerkats and Mink, and therefore likely to impede our ability to assess proper moral obligations towards animals. (Kemmerer, 2006) Use of the term '*anymal*' attempts to create man as distinct from animals.

Therefore, Kemmerer proclaims that, words used to describe ourselves as if we were different from all other animals tend to facilitate separation, a separation that defies the biological connection we share with them. Similarities we share with animals can help us in the process of determining our rightful moral relationship with the rest of the animal world. (Kemmerer, 2006) Even though this does not mean that animals are human beings.

The conviction of Mary Gore Forrester is that, if animals share same characteristics with humans, then they have the same rights that other persons have. The fact that an individual is not

a person does not make the way we behave toward it morally indifferent. It is wrong to cause pain to them under most circumstances. (Forrester, 1996) The differences between us and brutes should not be used as a leeway for arguing against our duties to animals, whether direct or not. More assertion by her is that, even if we could agree on what characteristics persons have, this does not necessarily tell us why persons are entitled to being treated in certain ways. What does being a member of the species *Homo sapiens* has to do with how one should be treated? (Forrester, 1996) It may not be easy to answer, because at end of all we may end up promoting more anthropocentrism than been non-anthropocentric.

Nonhuman animals according to Roslind Hursthouse claim is that:

Animals that lack the distinguishing features of the moral being- rationality, self-consciousness, personality and so on are not persons. In case there are non-human animals who are rational and self-conscious, then they, like us are persons, and should be described and treated accordingly. If animals are persons, they would be full members of moral community, with rights and duties like the rest of us. Creatures that are by nature incapable of entering into dialogue have neither rights nor duties nor personality. Animals if we had duties and rights regarding them, “then we should require their consent before taking them into captivity, training them, domesticating them or in any way putting them to our uses. (Hursthouse, 2000)

Our obligations to animals are not obligatory but rather personal and self -driven. Human rights and duties are reciprocal. Such reciprocity does not occur in our relation with other animals.

AKai Horsthemke, declares that, we are and since we are, therefore I am. In other words, a human being depends on other human beings. It would appear that the envisage concern for nonhuman nature and the environment could be fostered on only the basis of human benefits and would therefore not amount to any acknowledgment of intrinsic value of nature or environment. (Horsthemke, 2015) Though we recognize interconnectedness of human beings and non-human beings, such a connection is only for fostering human life.

Through, allowing animals to be owned by those who would raise them for food, as a source of various by products, as objects to be entered into competitions, or even as pets, we show that we are willing to treat them as mere means to satisfy human ends. (Francione, 1995) Hence our

responsibilities to animals are not direct duty or anchored on inherent value. Realizing Regan's efforts to elevate animals, treatment on the realm of intrinsic value goes overboard. The assertion that animals possess inherent value and omitting the fact that they hold instrumental worth which marks the genesis our responsibility to them seems to be dehumanizing.

Before doing any duty to an entity in the view of Wayne Ouderkirk, we should ask ourselves; what obligations do humans have towards the environment? The environment is taken to include some individuals such as nonhuman animals and plants. In determining our obligations, we first need to determine what sort of things has value in themselves or moral standing. (Ouderkirk, 2002) Intrinsic value in this matter becomes the determinant of who is to receive human's duties. Meaning that he agrees with Regan's that all beings possessing inherent value, ought to be considered as entitled to our obligations. Nathan Nobis notifies that:

Moral theory that best explains the nature of our moral obligations to human beings has positive implications for many animals as well. There are no relevant differences between the kinds of cases to justify protecting human beings but allowing serious harms to animals. Therefore, animals are due to moral protections comparable to at least those given to comparably-conscious, aware, sentient human beings. (Nobis, 2016)

Humans are able to use their rational ability to care for animals within the environment. Though brutes are not moral beings, our actions towards them should reflect our recognition that, we are overseers. Using our reasoning capacity we should reflect and decide whether to act or not depending on whether the actions support their wellbeing or not.

The understanding of Holmes Rolston the third is that, nonhuman beings or natural beings have intrinsic value and are worthy of moral respect. Each living being has a *telos* or a goal, and therefore can be seen as an evaluative system, valuing some things over others. Living beings have their own 'good' that can be respected by humans, should humans choose to do so. (Rolston, 2007) Just like Regan, he accepts that apart from human beings other beings that are biotic have inherent value and we have duty to them.

Singer campaigner of moral consideration in our dealing with animals declares that, some philosophers today seek to justify our current prejudices against nonhuman animals. They

maintain that, moral consideration should be extended only to those individuals who possess certain levels of rationality, intelligence or language or those capable of reciprocating moral agreements. (Singer, 2006) Since animals are not able to enter into any agreement, he tries to air out that, for some philosophers they cannot consider human beings as having a moral responsibility towards animals.

There can be no contract without communication and consent of the involved parties. Language becomes therefore the medium of sharing out the ideas. Animals are considered not to have a language, hence they cannot neither be understood nor understand. Brutes do communicate in their own way, only that we cannot understand their language. Realizing inherent value in animals calls for shedding off our prejudice but even if realized, we cannot forgo the fact that animals have instrumental values. Regan seem to use inherent value argument to overshadow the instrumental value and ends denying any use of animals in any way of benefit to humanity.

Regan disqualifies the indirect duty assertions by stating that, no serious moral thinker accepts the view that animals may be treated in just any way we please. All agree the legitimate moral constraints apply to our treatment of them. (Regan, 1983) Constrains do not apply to man to man duties but even Regan perceives it as applicable to our dealing with other animals. Thus, abolitionists pronounce do and don'ts in dealing with animals. We can therefore, as Regan puts it that, we may adequately account for the wrongs done to animals without having recourse to animal rights. (Regan, 1983) Ethical theories are what Regan and Singer beside other animal proponents uses to take defense for humans moral duty and concern to brutes.

Indirect duty in Preserving Endangered Species

In our preservation of animals regarded as endangered species, such a duty is categorized as indirect. Regan points out the common argument used by those who are against direct duty that:

In the case of rare or endangered species, for example' if we have duty to preserve them, this is not a duty we owe to the animals themselves. It is indirect duty owed for example to humanity. We owe it to human beings, both present and future generations; to take the necessary steps to insure that presently endangered species of animals continue to exist. They should exist so that these humans might, say, take pleasure in viewing them or increase their knowledge of the world by studying them. (Regan, 1983)

Preserving the life of animals and especially those who are categorized under the possibility of becoming extinct is our responsibility. The duties do not purely emerge for the animal's sake but because of what we might gain from preserving them. Regan I guess concerns himself much with the reason as to why we should treat animals morally, and not whether it is morally good to do so. Whether we treat animals well for human sake or for their sake it has nothing of moral concern in it. The reason as to why we say so is because at the end of the day nature must take its course. Meaning that, the chain of dependency on animals is inescapable.

Regan does not agree with the argument of indirect duty advocates, hence says that, we have duties directly to animals. Preservation of endangered species is a duty we owe directly to animals and not a duty directly owed only to humanity or say, God. (Regan, 1983) Our duties to God and to our fellow human beings are not of the same measure with those we might be indebted by animals. The Supreme Being is far much un-comparable to humans and nonhumans; we owe him much more than animals. Unlike nonhumans, we are stewards with moral responsibility to play.

Contractarian theory

The above stated theory is categorized by Regan as a supporter of indirect duty. The theory of contract has its basic idea that, morality shares essential features of contracting. Morality consists of a set of rules that all the contractors should follow; because doing so is in each contractor's rational self-interest. (Regan, 2003) Non-rational animals cannot enter into a contract hence, their interests matter not. Contract theory does not consider the interests of those who are not covered by the contract by not participating in it. Those who cannot take part in a contract are understood that, their interests do not form the basis of the contract, are not directly morally relevant. Thus, no direct duties are owed in their case. (Regan, 2003) We may be tempted to think that children and mentally handicapped are not included in the theory.

Some assertions indicate that it is not the case because it is said that:

The contractors have self-interested reasons in seeing that their own children are well treated. The reason may be that, for example (they will want their children to look after them in old age), thus, self-interested contractors would include rules that require that children should be well treated. Our duties in this case result from direct duties we owe to the rational, self-interested persons who devise the contract. (Regan, 2003)

In the case of other animals as may be evaluated from the contract theory it is argued that they cannot comprehend a contract. Therefore, they have no ability of participating and their interests are seen as not directly pertinent to morality. Hence, it is written that, they owe no direct duties. (Regan, 2003) Regan does not think the theory of contract can be elementary justifiable in its exclusion of animals from moral concern. Regan writes that:

Would we be justified in contractarianism as a basis for excluding animals or their interests from moral consideration? It is difficult to see how this could be reasonable. A moral theory that has so little to recommend when it comes to how other humans; may be treated would seem to provide a very poor basis for evaluating our treatment of other animals. (Regan, 2003)

The simple version of the 'simple contract' theory is faced with criticisms which consider them unworthy to cater for animals.

Direct Duty

The direct duty argument is contrarily to what the indirect duty arguments support. Direct duty asserts that, "humans and animals are owed direct duties. Those who support the direct duty views are, 'the cruelty kindness view and the utilitarianism, both moral theories are examples of direct duty views. (Regan, 2003) Here is what Regan describes the two theories under the direct duty.

Cruelty- Kindness View

Being cruel may be to maliciously induce pain or suffering to something. The cruelty-kindness view argues that, "we have a direct duty to be kind to animals and a direct duty not to be cruel. In saying the duty of kindness is direct means that, kindness is owed to animals themselves, not to be cruel is owed to animals directly. (Regan, 2003) There can be no objection to prohibiting cruel treatment of not only human beings but even animals. Some philosophers like Kant earlier on revealed why cruelty to animals can lead to acting the same where the victims are human beings.

Regan notifies that, some philosophers who favor kindness and condemn cruelty to animals deny that the duty in either case is direct. These philosophers encourage kindness and discourage cruelty to animals because of the effect these behaviors have on human character. Hence, this portends for how humans will be treated. (Regan, 2003) Treating animals in a kind manner may enhance treating our fellow human beings in a more humane manner. Showing kindness to

animals may portray about our character. We agree with the argument by the cruel-kindness conviction, but could this be taken to mean it is wrong to use animals as nature dictates, hence denying eating them or using them in ways profiting us? In case this is what it may boil to, it is also deceptive.

The pronouncement of the theory of cruelty-kindness, Regan justifies it makes a great positive contribution towards realizing our moral duties to animals. The writing goes that:

The cruelty-kindness view makes an important contribution to our understanding of morality. First, by recognizing that direct duties are owed to nonhuman animals; cruelty-kindness overcomes the prejudice of speciesism common to contractarianism. Second, any credible moral outlook arguably should find a place for kindness and against cruelty; not only when it comes to how animals are treated but also when it comes to our treatment of one another. (Regan, 2003)

According to the theory of cruelty – kindness, we may view right and morally justifiable actions as those show kindness to where the subjects are humans or nonhumans. Wrong actions are simply those which are cruel.

Regan, thinks we can be position to understand this theory if we grasp first the two key terms used in the theory, that is ‘cruelty and kindness’. Taking the latter term it is described that:

People express kindness when they act out of concern for or with compassion toward another. Kindness moves us to do things that advance the well-being of others; either by finding ways to satisfy their preference interest (what they are interested in having or doing) or by tending to their welfare interests (what is in their interests). The world, we think would be much better place if there were more kind people in it. (Regan, 2003)

On the other hand cruelty is a vice and it is described that, cruelty occupies a moral space opposite to that of kindness. People or their acts are cruel if they display either a lack of sympathy for causing another to suffer. (Regan, 2003) We should not act maliciously towards other animals, because going against that, is acting immorally.

Utilitarianism

Sometime back we pointed out that utilitarian theory regards maximization of pleasure and minimization of pain. Good or right actions are those which results to the greatest happiness of

all those affect by a given action. Singer adopts utility theory and influence much the discussion on ethics and animals from a utilitarian approach. Regan does recognize the contribution made by the approach involving the employing of utility theory. It does state that, similar interests ought to be counted as having similar importance. (Regan, 2003) However, he does not think by the fact that it argues from anthropocentric conception, it may defend animals fully.

What Regan thinks is worth of recognition from the theory of utility is the assertion that, we ought to do the act that brings about the overall balance between totaled preference satisfactions and totaled preference frustrations for everyone affected by the results. (Regan, 2003) In other terms both human beings as well as those of other animals should count equally. Our duties to animals count because similar interests are to be rendered equal consideration. Regan declares that, we have a direct duty to animal beings. (Regan, 2003) Our duties to other animals can be accounted for on the moral fact that just like humans have interests. Nonhuman animals we campaign should be treated well, we have duties to them, but unlike abolitionist, we consider using them as morally right. The argument raised by Regan's deontological ethics does not consider that our interests and duties of humans cannot be taken equally to those of nonhumans. Human beings interests surpass those of other non-rational beings. Regan therefore spells out that animals have rights and we have duties to observe those rights.

Conclusion

Our motive in showing how Regan leads to the horizon that, we have direct duties to nonhuman animals is built on. The approach he applies does not mount to the rights and duties reciprocal; rather he regards animals as patients, meaning they deserve our moral attention. The most touching argument is if animals owe us direct duties or indirect. Looking critically at the two stretching sides, that are so parallel we may advice that, it can be either way. When we refer to caring for animals, we care for them because they benefit us directly not them but when it comes to issue of if hurting them affects them directly, we state the animals are directly affected and deserve our direct duty not to maliciously hurt them.

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